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"Brexit means Brexit, and we're going to make a success of it." 1
Theresa May, Speech in Birmingham, 11 July 2016
"The only real alternative to a 'hard Brexit' is 'no Brexit'." 2
Donald Tusk, Speech at the Annual Conference of the European Policy Centre, 13 October 2016
"The British people should be given a final say on whatever deal is negotiated. If they are allowed 
that say, then Brexit can be averted." 3
Tony Blair, Speech to the European Policy Centre, 1 March 2018
"Rather than rescuing the European Union by keeping it intact, an exit from Brexit could splinter 
the Union from within." 4
Fabian Zuleeg, Exit from Brexit? Not likely but uncertainty prevails, EPC Commentary, 12 July 2016
BACKGROUND – TO BREXIT, OR NOT?
The will of the people?
The result of the Brexit referendum on 23 June 2016 came as a shock to many, including much of the political
establishment in the United Kingdom (UK). With a relatively narrow margin of victory (less than 4%) and Scotland,
Northern Ireland, and London clearly voting to Remain, the vote left the country deeply divided. The immediate
decision of Prime Minister David Cameron to resign, triggering a leadership contest in the Conservative Party,
added to the overall sense of dislocation. In addition, there was a degree of uncertainty about the final outcome.
In the UK, a referendum is non-binding and the final decision-making body remains the House of Commons.
Since there appeared to be a solid Remain majority in Westminster then, there was speculation that the result of
the referendum might not be followed, and that Brexit could be averted.
From an EU perspective, a UK reversal of the decision would surely have been welcomed in the summer of 2016.
But domestic politics in the UK was on a different trajectory. Abiding by the result of the referendum was portrayed
as the only democratic choice within both major parties, Conservative and Labour. Many (Conservative)
parliamentarians who had previously campaigned to remain committed to heeding the result of the referendum,
including Theresa May who was elected by the Conservatives to succeed David Cameron. In the leadership
election campaign, her slogan was 'Brexit means Brexit', making it clear that under her stewardship the UK would
leave the European Union (EU).
Brexit means Brexit
In the following months, positions hardened on both sides. The prime minister committed repeatedly to not only
leaving the EU, ruling out a second referendum, but also to exiting the Single Market and the Customs Union.
While legal cases established that the House of Commons had to be involved in crucial stages of the exit process,
when it came to decision time on whether to trigger Article 50, the vast majority voted with the government.
Consequently, the Article 50 letter, notifying the European Council of the UK's intention to leave the European
Union, was submitted on 29 March 2017, starting the two-year countdown with the foreseen endpoint marking
the moment when the UK will be outside the EU.
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Even though there was no desire to punish the UK, attitudes were also changing in the EU27. While most called for a
close economic and political relationship post-Brexit, there was also a rapid recognition, and remarkable unanimity,
that a special partnership or a form of associate membership could not be allowed to undermine the legal framework
of the European Union or the coherence of the EU's Single Market or trade policy. This led European Council President
Donald Tusk to conclude that "The brutal truth is that Brexit will be a loss for all of us. There will be no cakes on the
table. For anyone. There will be only salt and vinegar. If you ask me if there is any alternative to this bad scenario, 
I would like to tell you that yes, there is. In my opinion, the only real alternative to a 'hard Brexit' is 'no Brexit'." 5 But
while European leaders never ruled out an exit from Brexit, they were very conscious that it was highly unlikely.
Hope springs eternal
The path to Brexit thus seemed to be clearly set. But given the determination of the EU27 to not allow cherry picking,
and the political red lines of the UK – namely leaving the Single Market, the Customs Union and the jurisdiction of
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) – many in the UK have started to question the necessity for such a hard Brexit with
economically disastrous impacts. For some, there could only be a majority in the House of Commons for a soft
Brexit. When the courts affirmed Parliament's right to hold a meaningful vote at the end of the negotiation process,
many saw the road opening to a softer Brexit, overriding the red lines of the Brexiteers.
Theresa May's attempt to settle the question and assert her authority backfired spectacularly when the early
general election she called on 8 June 2017 led to a minority government, reliant on a deal with the Democratic
Unionist Party. Rather than delivering a 'strong and stable' government, able to negotiate in a confident and
unified way with the EU27, divisions within government and the Conservative Party have been there for all to see,
with the UK now playing a weak card in the negotiations with one hand tied behind its back.
More recently, a slow shift in public opinion and the increasing recognition that a hard Brexit jeopardises the open
border in Northern Ireland have emboldened once again those that see a chance that Brexit might not happen in
the end. The proponents of a second referendum, with a view of a reversal of the decision, are increasing and now
include, for example, former Prime Ministers John Major and Tony Blair. Many in the opposition parties are
advocating such a move, joined by some Tory rebels. So far, however, it is not the official position of the Labour
Party: its leader Jeremy Corbyn has clearly stated that "We are leaving the European Union"6. Nevertheless, there is
now a certain momentum toward an exit from Brexit – but how realistic is this?
STATE OF PLAY – REVERSING FROM THE CLIFF EDGE?
Where there's a will, there's a way?
Practically, the hurdles that would need to be overcome to stop the process are formidable, not least in terms of
timing. Tony Blair in his appeal for an exit from Brexit noted that there are only "months, perhaps weeks to think,
plan and act."7 Unless the process is stopped or extended, the UK will be outside the EU in March 2019; at which
point the exit from Brexit option disappears. But, in reality, timing is even more tight. A UK decision to withdraw the
Article 50 notification would have to happen well before that date to allow time to include the UK in the European
Parliament elections in May 2019, a legal necessity, given that the UK would remain a member state in this scenario.
This also makes any extension of the Article 50 period a tricky proposition. While the Article 50 process is under way,
the UK remains a member state with all the rights and obligations. If the EU decides to extend the Article 50 period,
the UK would have to take part in the EP elections and, depending on the length of the extension, the appointment of
the next EU Commission and the next Multiannual Financial Framework. In any case, an extension would require
the unanimous support of the EU27, making it highly unlikely. Even in normal times, unanimity is a high hurdle.
Here, specific issues are bound to be raised by individual member states intent on using the leverage of a hard
deadline to, for example, hold the UK to its commitments regarding the Northern Ireland border.
The alternative to an extension is to stop the Article 50 process altogether. But it remains unclear whether the UK can
simply withdraw the notification unilaterally or whether it needs the consent of the EU27 and the EP. Legal opinion is
divided so a court case in front of the ECJ would be needed to settle the question, which takes even more time. In
case the UK requires consent, any agreement is likely to include significant and unpalatable conditions around the
UK's budgetary contributions and its opt-outs, as well as its commitment to European integration.8 But even a
unilateral withdrawal of the Article 50 letter could carry a cost. In the next MFF negotiations, for instance, there
would be little appetite to allow the UK to retain its rebate. For the UK, there would be no possibility to legally tie a
remain decision to any reforms on the EU side in areas such as free movement of citizens. A revocation of Article 50
would result in a mere falling back to the status quo. Politically, some have argued that the EU27 should carry out
such reforms anyway to make a re-entry more tempting for the UK. But, there is no political will among the EU27 to
further accommodate the UK, and, most likely, not enough time left to negotiate such reforms. The only recourse for
the UK would be to use existing provisions under EU law to impose some constraints on freedom of movement to try
to persuade British voters that some more 'control' is being exerted.
The duty of sincere cooperation
A UK decision to revoke Article 50 would inevitably carry some ambiguity in the eyes of the EU27: while
preventing Brexit would mostly be seen positively, there would also be a concern that the UK would be an even
more awkward partner in future, with the domestic debate unresolved. In the end, the EU27 reaction to an Article
50 withdrawal would hinge on whether the UK is seen as making a real and genuine commitment to the EU, or
simply using a tactical ploy to buy more time. Politically, the EU27 would certainly reject any outright attempt to
play for time. Even in case the UK could normally withdraw the notification unilaterally, a tactical withdrawal of
the notification could be rejected by the ECJ as breaching the UK's legal duty of sincere cooperation, namely "to
assist each other in carrying out the tasks which flow from the Treaties."
But the situation might not be that clear cut. After all, uncertainty is one of the defining characteristics of Brexit.
What if the UK government falls and a new Prime Minister wants to go to the people again in a second referendum?
What if a new government pleads for time to sort out what has been left by the previous one, without knowing
whether the final outcome would be an exit from Brexit, EEA membership, a trade deal or something else
altogether? And what if Westminster rejects the final negotiated deal but has nothing else in place? At the very least,
this would create further uncertainty and political tensions in the EU27 of how best to handle such a situation.
PROSPECTS – TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE
Locked in
Regardless of the legal situation and how the EU might react to any attempt to reconsider the Brexit decision, the
biggest hurdles lie in UK domestic politics. It can be argued that EU reforms would help that process along but, aside
from the likelihood of that happening at this stage, the British people's reaction to David Cameron's 're-negotiation'
in the run-up to the referendum shows how limited the EU's influence is likely to be.
Within the UK domestic debate, only a minority of voices talk of an exit from Brexit, even on the pro-EU side. There
remains a great fear of being branded a traitor to democracy if advocating a reversal of the referendum vote.
Consequently, most Remainers are supporting the softest of Brexits as an alternative to the hard Brexit vision of the
UK government rather than an exit from Brexit. With few exceptions, it has become the most common alternative
scenario propagated by those in Labour, and among those Conservatives who disagree with Prime Minister May's
vision. Even among those who could potentially end up in the exit from Brexit camp – as a result of public opinion
decisively swinging in that direction – there remains a marked tendency to reject certain obligations and rules of
membership. Staying on as member of the EU without addressing any of the issues raised in the referendum
campaign seems a step too far, even for the remaining Remainers.
Any swing to remain would therefore have to be ascertained in a general election and/or a second referendum.
Even if there was sustained, broad and effective campaigning across the political spectrum to stay in the EU, there
is no guarantee that a vote would be won, let alone with a large and convincing margin. Many people who would
tend towards remain would vote on a range of issues, not solely on EU membership, and a significant part of the
electorate is likely to vote determinedly and angrily to strengthen extreme positions on Brexit to punish those who
would be seen by them as betraying not just Brexit but democracy itself.
In the long run…
Even if all the legal, political and practical hurdles were to be overcome, there would be no guarantee on the
longevity of the UK commitment to EU membership. After all, no real legal/constitutional safeguards exist that can
strongly bind future parliaments. So, in future, one cannot rule out another political backlash, which could lead to
an even more chaotic Brexit scenario implemented hastily by a staunchly anti-EU government.9 Even if the UK
remained in the EU in the long run, the UK would most likely be permanently marginalised.
For the EU27, the UK remaining is far from unambiguously positive. While it would prevent the immediate economic
costs and, arguably, would show the EU27 and the rest of the world that leaving the Union makes no sense, in
practical terms, it might make it even more difficult to find consensus in the EU. In addition, the possibility of the UK
restarting the process would always be in the back of leaders' minds. But despite misgivings, if the UK genuinely
rescinds its Brexit decision, the EU27 would have little choice but to welcome it, ignoring the negative impact the
Brexit process has already had.
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Schrödinger's Brexit
In the end, an exit from Brexit remains unlikely due to the domestic reasons outlined above. But there is another
scenario that would be difficult for the EU27 to deal with. The real crunch point for the UK government will come
when the House of Commons decides on the Withdrawal Agreement. If that deal is rejected, the UK is in a
desperate situation. Without an alternative deal on the table and with no time remaining to negotiate anything
else, Westminster would in reality not have a choice at all: even the worst of deals is better than no deal at all.
With an extension in the Article 50 negotiations highly unlikely, in that situation, there might well be a temptation
to (unilaterally) withdraw the Article 50 letter to buy time rather than genuinely wanting to remain. Arguably,
there could be the possibility of re-submitting the notification, for example, after a general election that would
confirm the UK's exit from the EU. It is far from clear what the EU27 response would be under this scenario and
whether unity could be maintained, especially if such a vote were accompanied by significant political change in
the UK, such as a change in government with a different political commitment to Brexit. It is high time that the EU
decides how to react to such a scenario, which might only be months away. At the very least, it should be made
clear that the EU27 can only react to a reversal in direction if it is backed up by a concrete and unambiguous
decision in the UK, and that any attempt to play for time will be rejected.
All that remains
In the end, despite the uncertainty and despite the negative implications of Brexit, the UK will in all likelihood
leave the EU in March 2019. There is only a very slim chance of reversal in the time left before the UK
automatically exits. But despite the remote possibility, the EU27 should not close the door to this scenario.
At the same time, the EU needs to continue to stick to its guns and "apply a large degree of Realpolitik, 
defending the EU's 'national interest' and holding the red lines of the four freedoms and exclusion from decision-
making."10 The first priority is to get a withdrawal agreement in place that would offer a satisfying solution for the
Northern Ireland border and define an (extendable) transition period. During the transition time, there is a need to
negotiate a trade deal while keeping the door open for higher levels of integration (EEA) short of membership if
this becomes politically feasible in the UK, while also including contingency planning for no deal, which remains
a distinct and high possibility also in the next stage of negotiations.
What happens in the very long run after the UK exist the European Union is hard to predict and will depend not
only on the divorce proceedings but also on how the EU-UK relationship develops over time. As Jean-Claude
Juncker puts it: "Once the British have left under Article 50 there is still Article 49 which allows a return to
membership and I would like that."11 So even though an exit from Brexit is unlikely, maybe a re-entry in future
remains a possibility – but not for a long time yet.
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